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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
In Vernonia School 
District 47Jv. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 
2386(1995), the Supreme Court 
of the United States held that a 
public school district's student 
athlete drug policy, which pro-
vided for random drug testing 
prior to participation in a sport, 
did not violate the student's 
Fourth Amendment right 
against unreasonable searches. 
In so holding the Court has 
broadened the scope of accept-
able bodily intrusions on stu-
dents by the government with-
out individualized suspicion. 
In response to a high 
level of drug use reaching epi-
demic proportions, Vernonia 
School District 47 J ("District") 
instituted a policy of random 
urinalysis drug testing for its 
student athletes prior to their 
participation in the schools' 
sports programs. The testing 
on athletes was instituted, in 
part, because athletes had been 
found to be leading the school's 
drug culture, and also because 
athletes who used drugs had a 
higher rate of serious injury. 
James Acton ("Acton"), a sev-
enth grader in Vernonia, Ore-
gon, signed up to play football 
in the fall of 1991. Acton and 
his parents refused to sign the 
urine testing consent form, a 
prerequisite to participation. 
Subsequently, Acton and his 
parents filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the 
District of Oregon, seeking de-
claratory and injunctive relief 
on the grounds that it violated 
Acton's Fourth Amendment 
right against unreasonable 
searches, and Article I, section 
9 of the Oregon Constitution. 
Following a bench trial, the dis-
trict court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the District's policy 
and dismissed the case. Acton 
appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, which reversed the dis-
trict court's decision. The Su-
preme Court ofthe United States 
granted the District's petition 
for certiorari. 
The Court began its 
analysis by reiterating that state 
compelled collection and test-
ing of urine constituted a search 
and was subject to Fourth 
Amendment scrutiny. Acton, 
115 S. Ct. at 2390 (citing Skin-
ner v. Railway Labor Execu-
tives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602,617 
(1989)). The Court explained 
that "the ultimate measure of 
the constitutionality of a gov-
ernmental search is 'reasonable-
ness. '" Id Thus, whether a 
search is reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment is deter-
mined by "'balancing its intru-
sion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against its 
promotion of legitimate gov-
ernmental interests. '" I d (quot-
ing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619). 
Justice Scalia, speaking for the 
Court, opined that since a war-
rant was not required to estab-
lish reasonableness in all gov-
ernment searches, probable 
cause was also not required 
'''when special needs, beyond 
the normal need for law en-
forcement, make the warrant 
and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable. '" Id. at 2391 
(quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 
483 U.S. 873 (1987)). Because 
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the warrant requirement would 
"unduly interfere" with teach-
ers' and school administrators' 
ability to maintain order and 
discipline within the school set-
ting, and since the public school 
system had been found to have 
such special needs in the past, 
the Court concluded that a war-
rant was not required by the 
Fourth Amendment in this situ-
ation. Id. (citing New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 
(1985)). Furthermore, while 
school searches based on suspi-
cion had been approved, indi-
vidualized suspicion itself was 
not a Fourth Amendment re-
quirement, so long as the search 
met the reasonableness stan-
dard. Id 
In determining the rea-
sonableness of such a warrant-
less search, the Court began by 
looking to the nature of the pri-
vacy interest upon which the 
search intruded. Id Since the 
Fourth Amendment only pro-
tects those expectations of pri-
vacy that society recognizes as 
legitimate, Justice Scalia rea-
soned that a schoolchild placed 
in the temporary custody and 
care of the State acting as a 
schoolmaster did,. not have such 
a reasonable expectation. Id at 
2391-92. As support for this 
lessened expectation of priva-
cy, Justice Scalia noted that 
schoolchildren are required to 
have physical examinations and 
to have been vaccinated before 
attending public schools. Id 
Student athletes, in particular, 
have even less of a legitimate 
privacy expectation, as locker 
rooms are not known for their 
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privacy, and students must un-
dergo physicals prior to play-
ing. Id. at 2392-93. 
The Court next ad-
dressed the character of the in-
trusion. Id. at 2393. While 
recognizing that the collection 
of urine intruded upon '" an ex-
cretory function traditionally 
shielded by great privacy, '" the 
degree of intrusion depended 
upon the method and monitor-
ing of the collection. Id. (quot-
ing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626). 
In the instant case, the process 
and method of obtaining the 
urine samples was nearly iden-
tical to those conditions found 
in a public rest room. Id. Fur-
thermore, because the test 
screened only for drugs and the 
results were given only to a 
limited number of school per-
sonnel, the Court held that the 
invasion of the student athlete's 
privacy was not significant. Id. 
at 2393-94. 
Lastly, the Court ad-
dressed "the nature and imme-
diacy of the governmental con-
cern at issue ... and the efficacy 
of this means for meeting it." 
Id at2394. TheFourthAmend-
ment does not require the least 
intrusive means available for a 
warrantless search to be legiti-
mate. Id. at 2396. Therefore, 
the District's method and pro-
cess of testing was not unrea-
sonable in light of the district 
court's finding that the students 
were in a state of rebellion due 
to drug and alcohol abuse. Id. at 
2395-96. The Court thus con-
cluded that the District's policy 
satisfied the requirement of rea-
sonableness and was therefore 
constitutional. Id at 2396. It 
warned, however, that 
suspicionless drug testing in 
other contexts would most like-
ly not pass constitutional mus-
ter, thereby narrowing the scope 
of its decision. Id. 
In dissent, Justice 
O'Connor, joined by Justices 
Stevens and Souter, argued that 
the majority had dispensed with 
the requirement of individual-
ized suspicion. Id. at 2397. 
Looking to the intent of the 
Framers, the dissent argued that 
the Warrant Clause was drafted 
to curb the abuse of all general 
searches, infamous during co-
lonial times, and not to impose 
an "evenhandedness require-
ment" now being instituted in a 
balancing test. Id. at 2399. The 
Framers attempted to prevent 
the overuse and misuse of gen-
eral searches by raising the re-
quired level of individualized 
suspicion to objective probable 
cause. Id Thus, in the criminal 
context, mass suspicionless 
searches, even if evenhandedly 
conducted, were per se unrea-
sonable where the search was 
more than minimally intrusive. 
Id. at 2400. 
Justice O'Connor par-
ticularly disagreed with Justice 
Scalia's characterization of the 
degree of intrusion that the Dis-
trict used in the collection ofthe 
specimen. Id. She emphasized 
that, though not the most intru-
sive of searches, the collection 
of urine was still "'particularly 
destructive of privacy and of-
fensive to personal dignity.'" 
Id (quoting Treasury Emp/oy-
eesv. Von Raab, 489U.S. 656, 
680 (1989». The dissent also 
noted that such a test intruded 
upon the freedom from search-
es of the person, one of the four 
specific categories of searches 
named in the Constitution and, 
as such, should be viewed with 
particular scrutiny. Id 
The dissent next argued 
that because such a blanket 
search would involve literally 
millions of children, as opposed 
to only thousands under a sus-
picion-based testing program, 
such a scheme would be "sig-
nificantly less intrusive," and 
as an established rule of law 
should not easily be cast aside 
in the name of policy. Id at 
2403 (emphasis in original). The 
dissent lastly argued that the 
majority's decision was ofseri-
ous consequence to students' 
individual rights under the Con-
stitution, id at 2404 (citing 
Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. 
Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 
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503, 506 (1969) (holding that 
students do not "shed their con-
stitutional rights . . . at the 
schoolhouse gate," in the con-
text of free speech», and that 
the District's suspicionless pol-
icy of testing all student ath-
letes randomly selected swept 
too broadly and imprecisely to 
be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 
at 2407. 
In Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton, the 
Supreme Court of the United 
States held that warrantless, ran-
dom, blanket drug tests on stu-
dent athletes were not unrea-
sonable in the totality of the 
circumstances, and therefore not 
violative of their Fourth 
Amendment right against un-
reasonable searches. The dif-
fering views of the majority and 
the dissent can be seen as 
primarily based on their 
respective view of schoolchil-
dren, the rights guaranteed to 
them as such under the U. S. 
Constitution, and the "reason-
ableness" of random testing. 
Thus, the question is one of 
degree, with the majority bal-
ancing the government's inter-
est in drug free schools over 
students' rights to freedom from 
searches of their person absent 
reasonable suspicion. In so 
holding, the Court has furthered 
the fight against drugs at the 
cost of students' rights against 
warrantless bodily intrusions 
previously guaranteed by the 
U.S. Constitution. 
- Francis A. Pommett III 
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